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I. INTRODUCTION
The year 1986 ended with yet another hijacking. On December 25,
1986 sixty-two persons were killed when an Iraqi airline crashed in Saudi
Arabia during a hijacking.' Only a few months before, Arabic-speaking
hijackers killed sixteen passengers and wounded many more just as
Pakistani officials began a rescue attempt of the New York bound Pan
American jet.2 Slightly more than one year before that incident, a group
of Shiite Moslems overtook TWA flight 847 just after leaving Athens In-
ternational Airport.3 In addition to these acts of hijacking, terrorists are
now, with alarming frequency, committing additional crimes by planting
bombs on aircraft.4
Increased international terrorism has raised concerns regarding air-
port security. The public, national governments, and airlines recognize
that some terrorist incidents might have been prevented had security de-
vices, presently available, been in use.' In fact, some victims of terrorist
attacks have brought suit against the airlines, arguing that existing secur-
1 N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1986, at Al, cal. 5.
2 N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1986, at Al, col. 6.
3 N.Y. Times, June 15, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
4 N.Y. Times, June 27, 1985, at AI, col. 4 (a bomb exploded as El Al Airlines security person-
nel inspected a suitcase at the Madrid International Airport, wounding 12); N.Y. Times, May 5,
1986, at A3, col. I (an explosion on an Air Sri Lanka jet, possibly the result of a bomb, killed
approximately 20 people while they were boarding the plane); N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1986, at Al, col.
6 (an apparent bomb explosion killed four and wounded nine on a TWA jet from Rome to Athens);
N.Y. Times,, June 24, 1985, at Al, col. 4 (a bomb, apparently planted in a suitcase aboard an Air
Canada jet, exploded while the plane was being unloaded at Tokyo's Narita Airport); N.Y. Times,
June 24, 1985, at Al, col. 5 (an Air India jet enroute from Montreal International Airport crashed
into the sea; officials speculated that a bomb was the cause).
5 See Security at Internati6nal Airports Has Tightened Since Hiacking, N.Y. Times, July 30,
1985, at Al, col. 2; Greece Comes Under Criticism for InadequateAirport Security, N.Y. Times, June
17, 1985, at A9, col. 2.
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ity devices should have been used.6 These lawsuits raise the question of
the extent to which airlines are liable to victims of terrorism when the
best available security measures are not employed by airlines to prevent
such attacks.7
Airline companies' liability for accidents in the course of interna-
tional air travel is governed by the Warsaw Convention ("Convention").8
Originally, the Convention limited airline liability to approximately
$8,300. 9 In 1955, an amendment to the Convention increased the liabil-
ity figure to $16,600.10 A voluntary agreement executed in 1966 by a
group of international airlines increased this amount to $75,000.11 The
most recent revisions to the Convention set the liability limit at approxi-
mately $120,000 and allow signatory nations to establish supplementary
compensation plans to increase that amount even further.' 2
The Convention does not limit the liability of an airline in instances
where the airline is found to have engaged in wilful misconduct.13 Crit-
ics of current airline and airport security believe courts should enforce
this wilful misconduct provision in cases where airlines have not em-
ployed adequate security measures currently available.14 These steps, the
critics claim, would reduce the total number of airport hijackings by pro-
moting increased airport safety. Moreover, by not limiting airlines' lia-
bility, courts could more adequately compensate victims of terrorism.' 5
On the other hand, although the present liability limitations may be
6 Hill v. Trans World Airlines, No. 85 L 20186 (Ill. fied Aug. 19, 1985)(settled out of court); In
re Hijacking of Trans World Airlines Aircraft on June 14, 1985, MDL 672 (D. Mass. 1986).
7 Diamond, Should an Airline Be Liable for Poor Airport Security, N.Y. Times, July 21, 1985,
§ 4 (Week in Review), at 7, col. 3.
8 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by
Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter
Warsaw Convention].
9 Id. art. 22.
10 The Hague Protocol to Amend the Warsaw Convention, done Sept. 28, 1955, art. XI, 478
U.N.T.S. 371 (1955)[hereinafter Hague Protocol]. The United States has not ratified the Hague
Protocol.
11 Civil Aeronautics Board Agreement 18,900, Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention
and the Hague Protocol, approved by CAB Order No. E-23680 (May 13, 1966), reprinted in 31 Fed.
Reg. 7302 (1966)[hereinafter Montreal Agreement].
12 Guatemala City Protocol to Amend the Warsaw Convention, done Sept. 28, 1955, arts. VIII,
XIV, ICAO Doc. No 8932, reprinted in A. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW, DOCUMENT SUPPLE-
MENT 975 (2d ed. 1981)[hereinafter Guatemala Protocol]. The United States has not ratified the
Guatemala Protocol. The provisions of the Guatemala Protocol relating to liability are embodied in
a subsequent protocol which the United States has also not ratified. See Montreal Protocol no. 3,
done Sept. 25, 1975, art. II, reprinted in A. LOWENFELD, supra, at 985.
13 Warsaw Convention art. 25. See infra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
14 See, e.g., Broder, Airport Security, N.Y.L.J., July II, 1985, at I, col. 1. See also Diamond,
supra note 7.




considered rather low, one must question whether removing these limits
would be tantamount to casting the airlines in the role of scapegoats for
an international political problem. One must also ask whether removing
the liability limits would violate the spirit and policy of the Warsaw
Convention. In view of such considerations, this Comment will first ex-
plore the history of the Convention, then examine the expansion of air-
line liabililty in cases of terrorism and wilful misconduct. Finally, the
Comment will explore alternative means of compensating victims of
terrorism.
II. HISTORY OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION
The Warsaw Convention was the result of two international confer-
ences held in Paris in 1925 and in Warsaw in 1929. It was hoped that the
conferences would plan for and alleviate problems which would confront
the emerging civil aviation industry in the future. 6 The primary goals of
the conference planners were to establish uniformity in documentation
(tickets and waybills), maintain uniformity in both procedural and sub-
stantive law applicable to claims arising out of international transport,
and limit airlines' liability for damages arising out of accidents. 17 At the
time, airlines needed to attract capital which might not otherwise be
available because of the risk of catastrophic accidents and large liabilities
for losses suffered in such accidents. Consequently, the limitation of lia-
bility was clearly recognized as the most important of these goals.18
Although the Warsaw Convention primarily served to protect the
airlines, certain provisions also protected passengers. 9 The Convention
rendered void "[a]ny provision tending to relieve the carrier of liability or
to fix a lower limit than that which [was] laid down in [the] Conven-
tion."20 Additionally, the Convention shifted the burden of proof to the
carrier to show that "he and his agents [had] taken all necessary meas-
16 Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 326 (5th Cir. 1967), cert denied,
392 U.S. 905 (1968); Husseri v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Rosman
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 34 N.Y.2d 385, 390, 314 N.E.2d 848, 851, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97, 101
(1974). See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 497, 498-99 (1967); Note, Warsaw Convention-Air Carrier Liability for Passenger Injuries
Sustained Within a Terminal, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 369, 370 (1976)[hereinafter Note, Warsaw
Convention].
17 See Block, 386 F.2d at 327; Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 16, at 498-500.
18 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 16, at 499.
19 Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Message from the President of the United States Trans-
mitting a Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules, SEN. EXEC. Doc. No. 6, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 3-4 (1934); Matte, The Warsaw System and the Hesitations of the U.S. Senate, 8 ANNALS AIR &
SPACE L. 151, 153 (1983).
20 Warsaw Convention art. 23.
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ures to avoid the damages or that it was impossible for him to take such
measures." 21 Thus, the quid pro quo given to passengers in exchange for
the shifting of the burden of proof to airlines to prove non-negligence was
the limitation of airlines' liability at approximately $8,300.22 The subse-
quent Montreal Agreement further protected passengers by establishing
a system of strict liability for injuries covered by Article 17 of the War-
saw Convention23 and by increasing the liability limit to $75,000.24
The limitation on airline liability does not apply in the case of wilful
misconduct on the part of the airline or its agents.25 Article 25 of the
Convention, however, does not define wilful misconduct and, as a result,
the term has been criticized because it is unclear and leads to difficulty in
interpretation.26 Some critics contend that Article 25 conflicts with the
Convention's objective of achieving uniformity in the substantive law be-
cause it allows courts in different jurisdictions and countries to interpret
wilful misconduct in accordance with their own laws.27 Some critics also
argue that if the proper limit for liability had been set, no means should
be available to circumvent that limit. On the other hand, supporters of
Article 25 contend that the limited liability provision should not protect
intentional acts.2"
Partly as a result of the criticism of Article 25, a diplomatic confer-
ence was convened in 1955 at the Hague to amend the Warsaw Conven-
tion.29  Article 25 was replaced by Article 13 of the Hague Protocol
which provided a definition of wilful misconduct.3 0 The delegates to the
21 Id.
22 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 16, at 500.
23 Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention states:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a
passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the
damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of
embarking or disembarking.
24 Montreal Agreement, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966). For an airline to be found liable, the passen-
ger's injury must be caused by an "accident," that is, an "unexpected or unusual event." Air France
v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 400 (1985).
25 Warsaw Convention art 25.
26 See Cheng, Wilful Misconduct: From Warsaw to the Hague and from Brussels to Paris, 2
ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 55 (1977); H. DRION, LIMITATION OF LIABILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL
AIR LAW 195-264 (1954); Beaumont, Some Problems Involved in Revision of the Warsaw Convention,
16 J. AIR L. & CoM. 14 (1949); Hjalsted, The Air Carrier's Liability in Cases of Unknown Cause of
Damage in International Air Law-Part II, 27 J. AIR L. & COM. 119, 133-36 (1960); Lowenfeld &
Mendelsohn, supra note 16, at 503.
27 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 16, at 503.
28 See id. at 503-04; Hickey, Breaking the Limit-Liability for Wilful Misconduct Under the
Guatemala Protocol, 42 J. AIR L. & CoM. 603, 609 (1976).
29 Hickey, supra note 28, at 605. Although 26 countries have signed the Hague Protocol, it has
never been signed or ratified by the United States.




Hague Protocol believed Article 13 would bring uniformity to the appli-
cation of the wilful misconduct standard while, at the same time, keeping
the door open to unlimited liability.31 As case law and the continued
disputes among commentators have shown, the Hague Protocol did not
achieve the desired uniformity. 32 As a result, the 1971 Guatemala Proto-
col 33 and, more recently, the Montreal Protocol Number 334 declared
that the liability limitations could not be broken even in the event of
wilful misconduct. One critic of inviolate liability limitations stated that:
The leap from a system premised upon the concern for compensating the
victim by eliminating fault in lieu of an absolute limited liability in all cases
even where the blameworthy conduct is performed intentionally, wantonly,
or in reckless disregard for the consequences is morally indefensible. The
victim is not completely compensated for the damages resulting from con-
duct which is tantamount to intentional conduct, and the wrongdoer enjoys
the protection of limited liability exposure regardless of the nature of his
conduct.
35
Although the United States adheres to the Warsaw Convention, it
has not ratified any of its protocols. The primary reason for resistance to
the Warsaw system by the United States has been the notion that the
liability limitations are too low. In fact, in 1965, the United States de-
nounced the Warsaw Convention for this very reason. 36 The United
States withdrew its denunciation when the airlines signed the Montreal
Agreement,37 thereby imposing a system of strict liability and increasing
a victim's potential recovery to $75,000. The Montreal Agreement, how-
31 Cheng, supra, note 26, at 90.
32 See supra note 26. The main controversy is whether the Hague Protocol requires an objective
or subjective standard in determining wilful misconduct. For a detailed discussion of these stan-
dards, see infra notes 73-102 and accompanying text.
33 Guatemala Protocol, supra note 12.
34 Montreal Protocol no. 3, supra note 11.
35 Hickey, supra note 28, at 608.
36 See In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia on April 22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982). "The
United States has not adhered to the Hague Protocol, at least in part because the limit on liability is
still too low to satisfy critics of the Warsaw Convention." Id. at 1305. For a more detailed discus-
sion of the Hague Protocol, see Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 16, at 509-16, 532-46. See also
SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, HAGUE PROTOCOL TO THE WARSAW CONVENTION, S.
EXEC. REP. No. 3, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
Another reason the Guatemala Protocol was never submitted to the Senate for advise and con-
sent was primarily because the liability limitations were linked to the price of gold, which was sub-
ject to severe fluctuations. Matte, supra note 19, at 158.
Although the Montreal Protocol No. 3 expressed liability in terms of special drawing rights
based on a basket of international currencies, the protocol was defeated because the liability limita-
tions were still too low. Opponents to the Montreal Protocol No. 3 hoped that its rejection would
lead to the overthrow of the Warsaw Convention's system of limited liability. See Kreindler, Recent
Developments in Aerial Hiacking: The Issue of Liability, 6 AKRON L. REV. 157 (1973).
37 See Montreal Agreement, supra note 11.
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ever, made no changes with respect to the definition of wilful miscon-
duct. Therefore, Article 13 of the Hague Protocol and Article 8 of the
Guatemala Protocol, while considered to be persuasive precedent, are
not binding on United States courts.
One judge viewed the Warsaw Convention and its subsequent modi-
fications as a double-edged sword-the basis of liability being strict, but
the recovery awarded being limited.38 The wilful misconduct provision
can effectively dull the limited liability edge, especially if courts apply a
loose standard.39 Yet the modifications of the Convention reveal tension
over the degree to which the wilful misconduct provision should be
broadly interpreted.
III. HIJACKING AND OTHER FORMS OF TERRORISM AS ACCIDENTS
In order to recover for injuries sustained as a result of terrorist acts,
a plaintiff must first show that an "accident" occurred. Article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention provides that:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or
wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger,
if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board
the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or
disembarking.40
In Air France v. Saks,41 Justice O'Conner, speaking for the United States
Supreme Court, recommended that a flexible definition of "accident" be
applied. She stated that liability under the Convention arises "if a pas-
senger's injury is caused by an unexpected or unusual event or happening
that is external to the passenger."'4 2 Justice O'Conner noted that lower
courts have broadly interpreted Article 17 to include acts committed by
terrorists.4 3
In fact, United States courts have long recognized that hijackings
are within the ambit of the term accident as used in Article 17. In Hus-
38 Maugnie v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 549 F.2d 1256, 1263 (9th Cir.)(Wallace, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977).
39 Id.
40 Warsaw Convention art. 17.
41 470 U.S. at 405.
42 Id. at 405.
43 Id. See also Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977)(holding
that a terrorist attack in a passenger terminal is an "accident"); Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975)(en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976); Krystal v. British Overseas
Airways Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1322 (C.D. Cal. 1975)(holding that a hijacking is an "accident"). But
see Martinez Hernandez v. Air France, 545 F.2d 279 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 950




serl v. Swiss Air Transport Company, Ltd.,' the defendant's aircraft was
hijacked to Jordan while en route from Switzerland to New York. The
plaintiff, a passenger, brought an action under the Warsaw Convention
for $75,000 for bodily injury and mental anguish resulting from the hi-
jacking. Swiss Air contended that if the cause of the damage was inten-
tional on the part of the terrorists, then an accident had not occurred and
the airline could not be held liable under the Convention. The district
court rejected the defendent's argument. Concluding that the hijacking
was within the ambit of the term accident, the court stated:
The Warsaw Convention as modified functions to redistribute the costs in-
volved in air transportation: the carrier is best qualified initially to develop
defensive mechanisms to avoid such incidents, since it physically controls
the aircraft and access to it; it is likewise the party most capable of assessing
and insuring against the risks associated with air transportation; finally it is
the party most able to distribute efficiently the costs of the first two steps.
Although the current problem of hijacking may have been initially unantic-
ipated, it is not unreasonable that the law would leap to fill this logical
gap.45
Some courts have expanded liability under the Convention to cover
injuries resulting from terrorist acts within airport terminals. In Day v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc." and in Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc.4 7 passengers sued TWA for injuries sustained in a terrorist attack
which occurred in an airport transit lounge. TWA argued that it was not
liable under the Convention because passengers in a transit lounge were
not engaged in the "course of embarking" as required by Article 17. The
United States Courts of Appeal for the Second and Third Circuits re-
jected TWA's argument and found the airline liable under the
Convention.48
In an analysis similar to Husserl, the Second Circuit in Day based its
decision primarily upon modem theories of cost allocation.49 The court
found that holding the airline liable would further the goal of accident
prevention by encouraging airlines to adopt more stringent security
44 Husserl, 351 F. Supp. at 702.
45 Id. at 707.
46 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976).
47 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1976).
48 Evangelinos, 550 F.2d at 155; Day, 528 F.2d at 33-34.
49 Day, 528 F.2d at 34. The court referred specifically to the works of Guido Calabresi, arguing
that "accident losses will be least burdensome if they are spread broadly among people and over
time." G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 39 (1970). The airlines are able to spread the
cost of increased security among all customers through ticket prices. See also Union Oil Co. v.
Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 669-70 (9th Cir. 1974)(imposing duty on oil companies, as best cost-avoiders,
to conduct commercial activities in a reasonably prudent manner in order to avoid inflicting com-
mercial injury on fishermen).
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measures against terrorist attacks. Airlines, the court reasoned, are in a
better position than passengers to persuade or compensate airport man-
agement to provide increased airport security. Airlines can also hire ad-
ditional security guards. The court concluded that "[airlines] can better
assess the probabilities of accidents, and balance the reduction in risk to
be gained by any given preventive measure against its cost."5° Addition-
ally, the Second Circuit stressed the advantage of the reduced adminis-
trative costs of a system of strict liability similar to the Montreal
Agreement as opposed to the maintenance of costly suits contesting lia-
bility against airport operators in foreign countries.51 Thus, the court
adopted a rather broad definition of "embarking," inclusive of passengers
in a transit lounge, to enable the plaintiffs to recover under Article 17.
The Third Circuit, in Evangelinos,52 agreed with the result in Day
but based its decision on other grounds. The court placed less emphasis
on carrier control and developed a tripartite test to determine liability.
The factors in the test include: 1) the location of the accident; 2) the
activity in which the injured person was engaged; and 3) the control of
the person by the airline.5 3 Based on these factors, the court found TWA
liable for the plaintiff's injuries.54
The Day and Evangelinos decisions have been criticized for ex-
panding liability contrary to the intent of the drafters of the Warsaw
Convention. For instance, the dissent in Evangelinos noted an inconsis-
tency between the desire to shield airlines from liability and the desire to
impose liability on the party most able to bear the cost.56 Additionally, it
is argued that, even though the system of strict liability and higher liabil-
ity limitations reflect an increased emphasis on passenger protection and
compensation of victims of "mindless crimes,"' 57 these concerns should
not cast airlines in the role of scapegoats for a complex problem con-
fronting many nations.58
A partial retrenchment from Day and Evangelinos occurred in Mar-
tinez Hernandez v. Air France.59 In that case the United States Court of
50 528 F.2d at 34.
51 Id.
52 550 F.2d 152.
53 Id. at 155.
54 Id. at 158.
55 Maugnie, 549 F.2d at 1262-63 (Wallace, J. concurring); Note, Warsaw Convention, supra note
16, at 385; Note, Terrorism in the Terminal: Airline Liability Under Article 17 of the Warsaw Conven-
tion, 52 N.Y.U.L. REv. 283, 289 (1977)[hereinafter Note, Terrorism in the Terminal].
56 Evangelinos, 550 F.2d at 159 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting in a 6-3 decision).
57 Note, Terrorism in the Terminal, supra note 55, at 289.
58 Note, Warsaw Convention, supra note 16, at 386-88.
59 545 F.2d at 282.
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Appeals for the First Circuit expressed approval of the Day decision and
the Evangelinos tripartite test, but failed to expand liability under the
Warsaw Convention to include acts of terrorism which occurred in a
baggage retrieval area." In Martinez Hernandez, the terrorists stored
their weapons in luggage which had been transported and handled by the
airline from the point of departure to the final destination. The terrorists
retrieved their luggage, took out submachine guns and grenades, and
opened fire on other passengers in the baggage retrieval area. The
court limited the scope of the term "disembarking" to activity effecting
the separation of passengers from the plane. The court found that bag-
gage retrieval was not an activity effecting separation from the plane and,
consequently, passengers retrieving their baggage were not in the process
of disembarking. The court reasoned that since the passengers were no
longer under the airline's control when they claimed their luggage (i.e.,
they could roam the terminal at will), the airline should not be held liable
under the Convention for injuries to the passengers.62
In its analysis in Martinez Hernandez, the First Circuit claimed to
endorse the modem theories of cost distribution espoused in Day, but
limited the application of such theories.
[I]f its application is not to do violence to the history and language of the
Warsaw Convention, there should.. .be a close logical nexus between the
injury and air travel per se.
A fundamental premise of the argument for expanding carrier liability
in this case is that the risk of death or injury in a terrorist attack is appro-
priately regarded as a characteristic risk of air travel.63
The court found that terrorist attacks, such as those in baggage retrieval
areas in airports, could occur in any public place and therefore were not
characteristic risks of air travel. Yet just because the attack could have
occurred in other public places does not mean that an airline should not
be found liable.64 It could be reasonably argued that a close logical nexus
60 Id. at 281.
61 Id. at 282.
62 Id. at 282-83.
63 545 F.2d at 284. See also Evangelinos, 550 F.2d at 159-60 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting).
64 For example, the Federal District Court for the District of Maryland found that the definition
of "accident" in Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention would encompass injuries sustained aboard a
flight by a passenger when an intoxicated fellow passenger fell on her. Oliver v. Scandanavian Air-
lines System, 17 Av. Cas. (CCII) 18,283, 18,284 (D. Md. 1983) This type of accident clearly could
have occurred in other public places, yet the airline still was found liable.
The Martinez Hernandez court distinguished attacks in a baggage retrieval area from hijackings
because hijackings, by definition, involve aircraft. 545 F.2d at 284. See also Evangelinos, 550 F.2d at
159. The First Circuit in Martinez Hernandez, failed to recognize that other modes of transporta-
tion, for example a boat, could be involed in a hijacking. Thus, under the First Circuit's reasoning,
even hijackings might not be risks characteristic of air travel. Finally, it is difficult to reconcile the
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between the injury and the air travel exists when, as in this case, the
terrorists retrieved their submachine guns and grenades from their lug-
gage which had been transported and handled by the defendant airline.6"
Thus, although the First Circuit might be justified in limiting the scope
of the term disembarking, it wrongly justified its decision in trying to
limit the scope of cost allocation.
IV. WILFUL MISCONDUCT-THE OBJECTIVE OR SUBJECTIVE TEST?
Once a court finds that an accident falls within the ambit of the
Warsaw Convention, the court must then decide whether the liability
limitations of Article 17 should be enforced. The low liability limitations
often lead to injustice and provoke distorted interpretations of the Con-
vention by courts.66 Moreover, the low limits encourage circumvention
by juries.67 The most obvious means of avoiding the limitations is to find
that an airline engaged in wilful misconduct.
The Warsaw Convention provides that:
The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this
convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by
his wilful misconduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance with
the law of the court to which the case is submitted, is considered to be
equivalent to wilful misconduct.68
The term wilful misconduct is a translation from the Convention's offi-
cial French text of the word dol. The French concept of dol differs from
the English concept of wilful misconduct.69 Typically, dol requires a
showing of fraud, deceit, or malicious or felonious intent.70 An actor
must have intended to cause the damage resulting from an act. Under
the English common law conception of wilful misconduct, an actor need
only have intended to cause the risk of damage and not necessarily the
damage itself.71 Thus, plaintiffs attempting to avoid the liability limita-
tions in jurisdictions which have adopted the official French text of the
Warsaw Convention, requiring a showing of dol, have a more difficult
First Circuit decision's support of Day and Evangelinos-extending liability to attacks in a transit
lounge as a characteristic risk of air travel-with its finding that attacks in the baggage retrieval area
are not characteristic risks of air travel.
65 545 F.2d at 281.
66 Martin, Intentional or Reckless Misconduct: From London to Bangkok and Back Again, 3
ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 145 (1983).
67 See Diamond, supra note 7.
68 Warsaw Convention art. 25.
69 Cheng, supra note 26, at 76.
70 American Airlines v. Ulen, 186 F.2d 529, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
71 Cheng, supra note 26, at 76.
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burden of proof than plaintiffs in jurisdictions which have adopted the
English concept of wilful misconduct.
In 1955, a meeting was held at the Hague in part to resolve the
controversy over the correct interpretation of Article 25. The drafters of
the Hague Protocol attempted to provide a clear and uniform definition
of wilful misconduct. Article 13 of the Hague Protocol states that:
The limits of liability specified in Article 22 shall not apply if it is proved
that the damage resulted from an act or omission of the carrier, his servants
or agents, done with intent to cause damage or recklessly and with knowl-
edge that damage would probably result; provided that, in the case of an act
or omission of a servant or agent, it is also proved that he was acting within
the scope of his employment.72
According to Article 13 of the Hague Protocol, a showing of something
less than dol-e.g., recklessness with knowledge that damage would
probably result-would be sufficient to avoid the limits of liability.
Unfortunately, Article 13 of the Hague Protocol has not resolved
the controversy over the meaning of wilful misconduct and, thus, has not
led to uniformity in the substantive law. In particular, courts disagree
over whether the Hague Protocol imposes, with regard to knowledge of
the probability of damage, an objective test (imputed knowledge) or a
subjective test (actual knowledge).73 A subjective test would, of course,
place a heavier burden of proof on plaintiffs and make it more difficult
for them to prove wilful misconduct.
Supporters of a subjective test argue that delegates to the Hague
Protocol, in a preferential vote, rejected an objective test in favor of a
subjective test.74 Others contend that the minutes of the conference re-
veal no explanation of the drafters' intent regarding the text which was
ultimately adopted.75 Even if the drafters intended a subjective test, the
United States has not yet ratified the Hague Protocol and its courts are
72 Hague Protocol art. 13.
73 In Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532, 538 (2d Cir. 1965),
cerL denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966), the court rejected the objective test and required actual knowledge,
which could be inferred from the surrounding circumstances, for a showing of wilful misconduct.
For a detailed discussion, see infra notes 78-86. In Goldman v. Thai Airlines Int'l Ltd., I W.L.R.
1186 (1983), the Court of Appeal adopted the subjective test; similarly in Tondriau v. Air India,
Judgement of Jan. 27, 1977, Cass. Belg., 1977 Revue Franaise de Droit A6rien [R.F.D.A.] 195, the
Belgian Cour de Cassation adopted the subjective test. For a more detailed discussion of the subjec-
tive test, see infra notes 87-92 and accompanying notes. In Emery v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines,
Judgement of Dec. 5, 1967, Cass. civ. lre, Fr., 1968 R.F.D.A. 184, a French court rejected the
subjective test, which had previously been the standard, and adopted the objective test. More re-
cently, however, the French Cour de Cassation returned to the subjective standard. For a more
detailed discussion, see infra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
74 Cheng, supra note 26, at 90.
75 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 16, at 506.
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not bound by it.7 6
Under an objective test, victims of an accident involving interna-
tional air travel must show that an ordinary, reasonable airline would
know, or should have reason to know, of the high risks associated with
its conduct.7 7 In Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, Ltd.,78
the defendant airline's plane crashed into a mountain as it began to land.
Berner, a relative of a passenger killed in the crash, alleged that the acci-
dent was caused solely by the defendant airline's wilful misconduct.7 9
Although the jury returned a verdict for the airline, the district court
judge ultimately directed judgment non obstante verdicto, holding as a
matter of law that the evidence established wilful misconduct on the part
of the airline. The judge stated that:
The Warsaw Convention was a device by which to subsidize the then infant
industry of international air transportation. It is a strange concept to us in
the United States that a subsidy should be taken out of the widows and
orphans of passengers. And, it is a far cry from the infant industry of 1929
to the international air giants of today.80
Even though the Hague Protocol required plaintiffs to show actual
knowledge on the part of the airline that damage would probably result
from the airline's conduct, the Berner court held that such a showing was
not required.8'
The pilot need not recognize this as extremely dangerous; it is enough if he
knows or has reason to know of circumstances which would bring home to
the realization of the ordinary reasonable man the highly dangerous charac-
ter of his conduct. The test is an objective one .... It is enough that he
realizes or, from the facts which he knows, should realize that there is a
strong possibility that harm may result even though he hopes or even ex-
pects that his conduct will prove harmless.82
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, how-
ever, reversed the district court's decision to grant Berner's motion for
judgment non obstante verdicto. The appellate court found that the trial
court had erred in stating that the Second Circuit did not require actual
knowledge on the part of the airline that harm would result from its
conduct.83 Muddying the waters even futher, the court further stated
76 See Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 219 F. Supp. 289, 323 (S.D.N.Y.
1963), rev'd, 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965).
77 Id. at 325.
78 Berner, 346 F.2d at 534.
79 Berner, 219 F. Supp. at 326.
80 Id. at 322-23 (emphasis in original).
81 Id. at 323.
82 Id. at 325-26.
83 Berner, 346 F.2d at 534. In Pekelis v. Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., 187 F.2d 122 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951), the following jury instruction was upheld:
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that the wilful misconduct standard is not entirely subjective.8A4 Conse-
quently, although the court rejected an objective test, the court did not
necessarily adopt a subjective test either. Rather, the court required at
least a showing of an airline's knowledge which could reasonably be in-
ferred from surrounding circumstances 5 In this way, the court fol-
lowed the spirit of the Convention, by requiring a showing of the airline's
knowledge, but made it somewhat easier for victims to recover by en-
abling them to prove knowledge by inference. Nonetheless, the court
held that even though the trial court judge improperly instructed the jury
regarding the standard for wilful misconduct, the jury's finding that the
airline was not guilty of wilful misconduct should stand because the same
result would have been reached under the Second Circuit's stricter
standard.86
English courts take an even more rigorous approach toward wilful
misconduct. In Goldman v. Thai Airways International Ltd.,87 the plain-
tiff was injured when the defendant's plane encountered turbulence. In
contravention of a rule found in the airline's operations manual, the cap-
tain had failed to switch on the seatbelt sign.88 The trial court, applying
an objective standard, found that the captain's omission "amounted to
recklessness with knowledge that the damage would probably result
within the meaning of Article 25. ''89
The Court of Appeal in Goldman reversed and applied a subjective
test, finding that the plaintiff failed to make the showing required by
Article 13 of the Hague Protocol that: 1) the damage resulted from an
act or omission; 2) the act was done with intent to cause damage; or
3) the actor was aware damage would probably result but acted in disre-
gard of that possibility; and 4) the damage complained of was the kind of
wilful misconduct is the intentional performance of an act with knowledge that the performance
of that act will probably result in injury or damage, or it may be the intentional performance of
an act in such a manner as to imply reckless disregard of the probable consequences.. .[or] the
intentional omission of some act, with knowledge that such omission will probably result in
damage or injury, or the intentional omission of some act in a manner from which could be
implied reckless disregard of the probable consequences of the omission....
Id. at 124. Similarly, in Grey v. American Airlines, 227 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 989 (1956), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that an airline has engaged in
wilful misconduct if it has:
a conscious intent to do or omit doing an act from which harm results to another, or an inten-
tional omission of a manifest duty. There must be a realization of probability of injury from the
conduct, and a disregard of the probable consequences of such conduct.
Id. at 285.
84 Berner, 346 F.2d at 538 n.4.
85 Cheng, supra note 26, at 75.
86 Berner, 346 F.2d at 538.
87 1 W.L.R. 1186 (1983).
88 Id. at 1191.
89 Id. at 1191-92.
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damage known to be the probable result of such action.9" The Court of
Appeal found that, even though the pilot broke a rule apparently in-
tended for passenger protection, he still had to have actual knowledge
that injury would probably result from breaking that rule.9" One com-
mentator stated that, by adopting such an approach, the English courts
discouraged airlines from settlements in amounts above the Convention's
limits to avoid costly litigation because, under the subjective test adopted
by the Court of Appeal in Goldman, wilful misconduct would indeed be
hard to prove. 92
It follows that, if a court applies an objective test, the court is more
likely to find wilful misconduct than if it were to apply either the test
adopted by the Second Circuit in Berner or a subjective test. In Emery v.
Sabena Belgian World Airlines,93 the defendant's airliner inadvertently
veered off course by sixty-five kilometers and crashed. The trial court, in
a decision later affirmed by the Paris Court of Appeal, ruled that the
airline must have had effective knowledge of the mistake.94 The Cour de
Cassation, the highest French court of ordinary jurisdiction, reversed this
ruling and held that, by subjectively assessing the mistakes made by the
airline, the lower courts violated the Warsaw Convention.95 On remand,
the Court of Appeals of Orleans applied an objective test and, not sur-
prisingly, found that because the crew did not use all available naviga-
tional aids to verify their position, they had engaged in wilful misconduct
notwithstanding their lack of knowledge that they were off course.9 6
More recently, the Cour de Cassation seems to have applied a sub-
jective standard for determining wilful misconduct. In Bornier v. Air-
Inter,97 a passenger who was seriously injured by a hijacker sued the air-
line and alleged wilful misconduct under Article 25. The airline did not
conduct preflight checks on passengers and did not intervene with au-
thorities to achieve effective checks.98 The Cour de Cassation held that
the airline did not act with actual knowledge. The airline was found not
90 Id. at 1194. The court stated that if Article 25 of the Hague Protocol only contained the word
"recklessly"-thus deleting the knowledge requirement-the plaintiff would have proved his case
because the pilot ignored safety instructions, thereby demonstrating a willingness to accept responsi-
bility for the risk to the passengers' safety.
91 Id. at 1200.
92 Martin, supra note 66, at 149.
93 Judgement of Mar. 24, .1965, Cour d'appel, Fr., 1965 R.F.D.A. 487 (1965), rey'd, 1968
R.F.D.A. 184 (translated and quoted in Cheng, supra note 26, at 80-81).
94 1965 R.F.D.A. at 549.
95 1968 R.F.D.A. at 194.
96 Judgement of Apr. 24, 1969, Cour d'appel, Fr., 1969 Revue G6n6rale de l'Air et de l'Espace
[R.G.A.E.] 438.




guilty of wilful misconduct and the plaintiff was subject to the limitations
on liability.99
In LeRoy v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines,"c° which arose out of
the same accident as in Emery, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit also found that the liability limitations of the Warsaw
Convention did not apply when the airline engaged in wilful miscon-
duct.10 1 Unlike Emery, in which the plaintiff claimed the crew should
have known they had veered off course, the plaintiff in LeRoy contended
that, in order to avoid a delay in landing, the crew falsely reported their
position to the controller. The plaintiff supported this proposition with
indirect evidence. The Second Circuit found that the jury's finding of
wilful misconduct was supported by the evidence, even if the plaintiff's
theory relied on indirect evidence. 0 2 Thus, even though the Second Cir-
cuit applied a more rigorous standard by requiring a showing of knowl-
edge, which could be inferred from surrounding circumstances, and
thereby allowing the plaintiff to recover in an amount beyond the liability
limitations, the Second Circuit reached the same conclusion the Court of
Appeals of Orleans in Emery. Had the Second Circuit applied the sub-
jective test in the same manner as the English courts, it seems doubtful
the court would have found evidence of wilful misconduct on the part of
the airline. 10 3
V. WILFUL MISCONDUCT-THE PROXIMATE CAUSE ISSUE
Even if an airline engages in wilful misconduct, in order to recover
beyond the liability limitations, plaintiffs must be able to show that the
wilful misconduct was the proximate cause of their harm."°4 In Goepp v.
99 Id.
100 344 F.2d 266 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 878 (1965).
101 Id. at 268.
102 Id. at 271. The Second Circuit applied the same standard for wilful misconduct (i.e., whereby
knowledge of the probability of harm can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances) as it did
in Berner, 346 F.2d at 538. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
103 See Goldman, I W.L.R. at 1200 (the subjective test requires actual knowledge that injury
would probably result from the defendant's act).
104 Pekelis, 187 F.2d at 124. The Second Circuit upheld a jury instruction stating:
If, however, you find that the defendant.. .committed one or more acts of wilful misconduct,
then you must go on to consider whether or not such wilful misconduct as you have found was
the proximate or legal cause of the death of Mr. Pekelis .... I say that the wilful misconduct
must be a substantial factor in bringing about the death. You will note I did not say it must be
the sole substantial factor contributing to the death.
Id. (emphasis in the original). See also International Mining Corp. v. Aerovias Nacionales de Co-
lombia S.A., 45 N.Y.2d 915, 383 N.E.2d 866, 867, 411 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1978); Wing Hang Bank, Ltd.
v. Japan Air Lines, Co., Ltd., 357 F. Supp. 94, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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American Overseas Airlines, Inc.,"' a New York appellate court reversed
a jury's finding of wilful misconduct. The plaintiff in Goepp brought suit
for the wrongful death of a passenger aboard the defendant airline's
plane which crashed. The jury found that because the airline violated
safety regulations of the United States Civil Aeronautics Board, the air-
line was guilty of wilful misconduct and awarded the plaintiff damages of
$65,000. 106 On appeal, however, the court reasoned that the alleged vio-
lations bore no causal connection to the accident and, therefore, the air-
line was not liable in amounts beyond the Convention limits.107 Judge
Breitel, dissenting, stated that the proximate cause issue was a question
of fact for the jury and that the jury could have reasonably found that the
violations were the proximate cause of the crash. Judge Breitel stated
that:
It should be obvious too that with respect to air accidents, because of the
mysteries in which the fatal and more serious accidents become shrouded, a
liberal approach in finding proximate cause from any kind of misconduct
which may lead to multiple fatalities is socially justified, if not re-
quired .... The risks of air transportation are great and are assumed by the
passenger; but he should have the right to rely on the carrier's adherence to
officially required standard of care.108
A New York district court relied on the New York Court of Ap-
peals' proximate cause analysis in Goepp to find that an airline was not
guilty of wilful misconduct in an action to recover the value of a plain-
tiff's stolen shipment. In Wing Hang Bank, Ltd. v. Japan Air Lines Co.,
Ltd.,"9 the defendant airline transported the plaintiff's cash shipment of
$250,000 from Hong Kong to New York. Upon its arrival in New York,
the defendant, pursuant to agreement, delivered a package to another
airline for storage until it was to be picked up by the plaintiff's consignee.
The storage area was enclosed by heavy wire, kept under lock, patrolled
by guards, and monitored by closed circuit television. The guards, how-
ever, were unarmed and no particular employee was responsible for mon-
itoring the television. While the plaintiff's package was in storage, armed
robbers broke in and stole the package along with other items.110
The plaintiff bank claimed the airline was guilty of wilful miscon-
duct because it knew the other airline's security was poor since a robbery
105 281 A.D. 105, 117 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1952), affid, 305 N.Y. 830, 114 N.E.2d 37, cert. denied, 346
U.S. 874 (1953).
106 Id. at 107-08, 117 N.Y.S.2d at 278.
107 Id. at 110, 117 N.Y.S.2d at 280.
108 Id. at 113, 117 N.Y.S.2d at 283 (Breitel, J., dissenting).
109 357 F. Supp. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
110 Id. at 95-96.
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had occurred at that storage facility approximately one year earlier.11'
The district court, however, found that because of the large volume of
valuable freight which had been safely handled by the storage facility,
one robbery "hardly [made] a case of poor security." 12 The Wing Hang
Bank judge chose not to use the liberal approach to proximate cause rec-
ommended by Judge Breitel in his dissent in Goepp, stating that:
[w]hile it is true that the guards patrolling the area were unarmed, that fact
could not be said to have contributed to the robbery since robberies occur
every day despite the presence of armed guards .... [T]he proximate cause
of plaintiff's loss was the armed robbery, and not the carelessness, malfea-
sance or misfeasance of the carriers.1 13
The court held that the plaintiff could not recover beyond the established
limits of the Warsaw Convention because it failed to show that the air-
line's wilful misconduct set the armed robbery in motion. 14
A stricter approach to proximate cause may be socially justified
when the loss involves damage to cargo. In cases in which passenger
safety is at stake, however, courts should consider Judge Breitel's policy
argument in Goepp and adopt a more liberal approach to proximate
cause issues.
VI. WILFUL MIscoNDUCT AND AIRLINE LIABILITY FOR TERRORISM
As long as an airline is aware that an airport poses threats to passen-
ger security, a jury might find the airline guilty of wilful misconduct even
if the airline did not have total control of airport security.1 15 In many
airports, however, the airport itself is responsible for preboarding secur-
ity and the airlines, at their option, may provide additional security
checks. Airports as well as airlines now possess, or could easily possess,
security measures which, if implemented, would reduce the risk of terror-
ist activities. Available security measures include metal detectors, X ray
and physical search of carry-on and checked luggage, and profiles of po-
tential terrorists.1 16
111 Id. at 97.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. See also International Mining, 45 N.Y.2d at 916, 383 N.E. 2d at 867, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 221,
in which the court overturned a jury's finding of wilful misconduct. The court stated that: "No
evidence was offered which established the manual procedures, if carefully followed, were insufficient
to provide reasonable security protection or that the carrier's security system was otherwise deficient
in design or organization." Id.
115 See Diamond, supra note 7.
116 For example, New York's Kennedy and LaGuardia Airports and New Jersey's Newark Air-
port now rely on increased security measures including increased police patrols, tamper resistant
employee identification cards, intelligence briefings to personnel, and an employee incentive program
which rewards $25 to airport workers who prevent unauthorized entry into restricted areas and arms
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Several factors, however, influence the amount of additional security
measures airlines attempt to provide. For example, because profiles of
potential terrorists list young Arabs as being highly suspect, local gov-
ernments, claiming that the use of such profiles harms their relations
with Middle Eastern countries, pressure airlines to stop using them.1 17
Physical searches of luggage cause passenger inconvenience which air-
lines prefer to avoid.11 Although the economic costs associated with
some of these security measures may not be very high, airlines might still
choose not to employ them. One method of determining the amount of
security measures to be provided balances the costs of the security meas-
ures, including passenger inconvenience, against potential harm to airline
passengers.1 1 9 Ideally, as the risk of terrorism increases, so should the
amount of security measures, even in the face of increased inconvenience
and costs. 120
The question remains, however, whether an airline, in balancing
these costs, engages in wilful misconduct or negligent conduct if the se-
from being illegally carried aboard an aircraft. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1986, at B3, col. 2. Broder,
supra note 14, at 1, col. 1.
The question of whether the use of certain security measures result in equal protection and due
process violations has been addressed by many courts. In United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077,
1101-02 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), the court held that an antihijacking program which included the use of
profiles and magnetometers to identify potential hijackers was constitutional only if it adhered to the
standards of absolute objectivity and neutrality. For other cases upholding the constitutionality of
such programs, see United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Dalpiaz,
494 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991
(1972); United States v. Mitchell, 352 F. Supp. 38 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); United States v. Edmunds, No.
71 C.R. 251 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1972).
117 See Broder, supra note 14, at 4, col. 2. In particular, the Greek government pressured TWA
not to use the profiles. TWA claimed it stopped using the profile because all passengers were
checked with X ray devices and magnetometers by airport and TWA personnel, thus there was no
need to use the profile. The use of profiles, however, might have provided TWA with an opportunity
to search highly suspect individuals. Id.
It seems doubtful that the use of such characteristics as race and national origin would violate
the Fourteenth Amendment. In Lopez, the court found that the profile characteristics "do not dis-
criminate against any group on the basis of religion, origin, political views or race. They are pre-
cisely designed to select only those who present a high probability of being dangerous. Thus, they
violate none of the traditional equal protection standards." 328 F. Supp. at 1086-87 (citing Williams
v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968)).
118 See Broder, supra note 14, at 4, col. 3.
119 Id. See also Panel Discussion: Laws, Legislation, and the United States Participants, I SYRA-
CUSE J. INT'L L. & COM., 285, 293-95 (1973)(statement of Mr. Willis, an attorney with the Office of
the Legal Advisor for the United States Department of State)[hereinafter Panel Discussion].
120 In response to recurring and intense terrorist threats, Italy tightened its security measures at
Rome's Leonardo da Vinci Airport. These measures included placing large numbers of armed police
at the international terminal, requiring travelers chosen at random to produce tickets and passports,
and increasing the number of plainclothes police. N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1986, at A3, col. 1. Many
passengers delayed by similar increased security measures at major United States airports welcomed
such vigilance. N.Y. Times, July 6, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
Warsaw Convention
8:249(1987)
curity measures fail to thwart the efforts of terrorists. One case which
raised this question 2' involved the bombing of a TWA jet leaving Athens
in 1974. The plaintiffs, suing TWA for the wrongful deaths of those
killed on board the plane, contended that the incident occurred "as a
result of TWA's persistent refusal to institute and maintain an effective
and adequate security system at the Athens Airport." 122 The jury found
TWA liable for lack of due care, i.e., negligence, but, more importantly,
did not find wilful misconduct on the part of the airline. 123
In 1985, another TWA plane departing from the Athens Airport
was the subject of a terrorist attack. 24 Critics of TWA argue that, in
light of increasing international terrorism, and especially in light of the
similar circumstances involving the 1974 bombing, TWA was or should
have been on notice to improve its security measures. 125 As one critic
stated, "[TWA's] reluctance to learn from its own experience would be
evidence tending to prove wilful, wanton malfeasance."' 126 Still, a finding
of wilful misconduct depends on what standard a court applies and
whether the wilful misconduct was the proximate cause of a plaintiff's
injuries.
If a court applies an objective test, 127 a finding of wilful misconduct
may be more likely than if it applies the subjective test. Arguably, an
airline might have reasonably believed, or should have reasonably be-
lieved, that harm from terrorist activity would increase and yet not em-
ploy the above-mentioned security measures. If so, a judge or jury might
find evidence showing wilful misconduct. Alternatively, if a court ap-
plies a subjective test,' 28 or the Second Circuit's test, in which knowledge
may be inferred from surrounding circumstances, 129 a finding of wilful
misconduct is less likely, although not impossible. The question with
respect to these tests is not whether the airline knew of the possibility of
harm, but whether it knew of the probability of harm.' For instance,
an airline might be able to successfully argue that because of the high
volume of passengers transported safely, the airline's security measures




124 N.Y. Times, June 15, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
125 Broder, supra note 14, at 4, col. 4.
126 Id.
127 See supra notes 77-82, 93-96 and accompanying text.
128 See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
129 See supra notes 83-86, 100-02 and accompanying text.
130 Cheng, supra note 26, at 70.
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were adequate13 ' and that the airline had no reason to know of the
probability of harm to its passengers. On the other hand, if an airline
was warned of impending terrorist activity and failed to increase its se-
curity measures, the airline would know that its failure to act would
probably lead to injury. 132 Or, if an airline violated specific safety rules
(either its own rules or those of a government or regulatory agency), it
could be argued that the airline knew of the probability of injury. 133 Ab-
sent a showing of such knowledge, however, an airline should not be
found liable under either the subjective or Second Circuit test.
Additionally, an airline might argue that, even if its actions consti-
tuted wilful misconduct, such actions still were not the proximate cause
of its passengers' injuries. In other words, the airline could argue that its
failure to employ better security measures did not necessarily contribute
to the terrorism since such acts occur despite the presence of improved
security measures. 134 In fact, no matter how extensive the security meas-
ures are, some terrorists will probably be able to evade the measures,
board the aircraft, and commit crimes. 135 Unless passengers could show
that the airline's wilful misconduct set the hijacking in motion, it could
be argued that the carelessness, misfeasance, or malfeasance of the airline
was not the proximate cause of the passengers' injuries and that the air-
line should be protected by the Warsaw Convention's limitations on air-
line liability.136 Yet a court might justify a more liberal approach to the
proximate cause issue in order to provide more protection to passengers
who must rely on an airline to transport them safely to their final
destination. 137
Clearly, if airlines are exposed to unlimited liability for terrorist ac-
tivities, the airlines might consider the potentially unlimited cost as a
131 See supra notes 104-114 and accompanying text.
132 In the Air India crash in which the plane left from Montreal, the Canadian government stated
that "extraordinary security measures were not put into place for Flight 182 because no specific
threat had been made against the flight." Broder, supra note 14, at 4, col. 3. Yet as a result of a
threat sent in a letter, Air India requested that Canada increase security measures. See N.Y. Times,
June 15, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
133 One court approved the following charge to the jury:
Now, the mere violation of those [safety rules and regulations].. .even if intentional, would not
necessarily constitute wilful misconduct, but if the violation was intentional with knowledge
that the violation was likely to cause injury to a passenger, then that would be wilful miscon-
duct, and likewise, if it was done with wanton and reckless disregard of the consequences.
American Airlines, 186 F.2d at 533. See also Goepp, 281 A.D. 105, 117 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1952); Inter-
national Mining, 45 N.Y.2d at 916, 383 N.E.2d at 867, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 221.
134 See Wing Hang Bank, 357 F.Supp. at 97.
135 Panel Discussion, supra note 119, at 294.
136 See Wing Hang Bank, 357 F. Supp. 94.
137 See Geopp, 281 A.D. at 113, 117 N.Y.S.2d at 283 (Breitel, J., dissenting).
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reason to improve further security measures.13 8 A broad interpretation
of wilful misconduct in such cases would accord with courts' concerns
over improved passenger protection. Such reasoning, however, conflicts
with the purpose of the Warsaw Convention and its subsequent proto-
cols: limiting airlines liability for disasters. 139
Although courts are bound by the Warsaw Convention limitations,
they generally do not favor them, especially when widows and orphans
are not fully compensated by the airline industry. 4 ° Courts presumably
would prefer not to distinguish claims arising from accidents occurring
on international flights from those occurring on domestic flights. In do-
mestic air travel, an airline's liability is based on a negligence standard
and liability is potentially unlimited.141 Yet courts should not employ
the wilful misconduct provision of the Warsaw Convention simply to al-
low plaintiffs to recover amounts comparable to those recoverable in do-
mestic airline accident cases unless such courts apply a proper standard
for finding wilful misconduct on the part of an airline. Based upon the
history of the Convention, it seems that courts should apply a standard
which requires a showing of an airline's knowledge of the probability of
harm as a result of the airline's actions. 42 Although this might result in
seemingly harsh settlements for victims of terrorism, a change in the law
involving an international convention should come from Congress, not
the courts. This difficult burden of proof placed on the victims can be
somewhat relaxed by following the standard set by the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in Berner, which allows the knowledge element to
be inferred from surrounding circumstances.1 43
VII. ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF PROTECTING PASSENGERS
Aircraft hijackings are not uncontrollable if interested parties-gov-
ernments, air carriers, air transport personnel, and the travelling pub-
lic-are willing to take and endure necessary, albeit inconvenient, safety
precautions. 1" To this end, Congress recently passed the Security and
Development Act, 45 which includes a section dealing with international
138 See Hickey, supra note 28, at 618-19.
139 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 16, at 499.
140 Berner, 219 F. Supp. at 322-23.
141 No general standard of liability exists for hijackings of domestic flights. Kizzia, Liability of
Air Carriers for Injuries to Passengers Resulting from Domestic Hiackings and Related Incidents, 46
J. AIR L. & COM. 147, 152 (1980). See Kreindler, supra note 36.
142 See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
143 See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
144 Evans, The Law and Aircraft Hiacking, 1 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 265, 273 (1973).
145 International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-83, 1985
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (99 Stat.) 191.
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terrorism and foreign airport security. Specifically, the act lists the fol-
lowing security measures which might be employed to curb airline-re-
lated terrorism: 1) blacklisting unsafe foreign airports; 2) increasing aid
to foreign governments for the purchase or manufacture of anti-terrorist
devices; 3) suspending aid and military exports to those foreign nations
whose airports fail to meet United States security standards; 4) granting
funds for research and development of new security measures; 5) barring
foreign carriers from landing in the United States if they are arriving
from unsafe airports; 6) studying the merits of a sky marshall program;
and 7) seeking multilateral and bilateral agreements on strengthening en-
forcement measures and standards for compliance. 146 It has been sug-
gested that both airlines and airports be publicly rated with respect to
their security measures in the same manner restaurants and hotels are
rated for the services they provide. 147 Insurance companies might im-
prove security by refusing to provide coverage for unsafe airlines. 14 8 An-
other possibility would be a statutory requirement on gun manufacturers
to include a specified amount of metal in otherwise plastic guns, sufficient
to trigger a metal detector. 49 Finally, some individuals have suggested
holding an international conference on terrorism which would confront
various issues, including cooperation among countries to discourage and
to punish terrorism.150
In addition to attempting to reduce the risk of terrorism, Congress
should also consider modifying the existing system of liability in order to
ensure proper recovery for victims of terrorism. Congress should de-
nounce the Warsaw Convention and adopt a negligence system of airline
liability similar to the one applicable to domestic air travel. Congress
could establish a trust fund to provide additional compensation to vic-
tims of terrorism as acts of terrorism are usually committed with the
stated object of furthering some political interest or goal. Alternatively,
airlines could establish a compensatory trust fund to compensate victims
146 Id.
147 Broder, supra note 14, at 4, col. 4. Additionally, a New York Times editorial suggested that,
to establish a "leak-proof system of diplomatic deterrence," the United States could use the purchas-
ing power of travelers to compel collaboration among world governments. Airlines, if not allowed to
land in the United States, would face bankruptcy, and many tourist economics would collapse in the
face of a United States boycott. Yes, There Is Something We Can Do, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1985, at
A26, col. 1.
148 See N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1987, at A13, col. 1. Insurers of Middle East Airlines-Lebanon's
national airline-withdrew all coverage of passengers flying with that company. As a result, the
airline halted all flights to Beirut Airport.
149 N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1986, at E22, col. 2.
150 N.Y. Times, June 24, 1985, at A15, col. 5. Signatory nations would prosecute those charged
as terrorists or extradite them to countries wishing to prosecute. Information would be exchanged




of airline-related terrorism, perhaps by adding a surcharge to the price of
airline tickets.151
VIII. CONCLUSION
In many cases, the Warsaw Convention precludes adequate compen-
sation for victims of terrorism. To date, airlines are automatically liable
only up to $75,000 for accidents occurring on board an airplane or dur-
ing the course of embarking or disembarking.'52 Courts in the United
States have consistently found that hijacking and other forms of terror-
ism are within the ambit of an accident, although some courts have re-
fused to extend liability for accidents occurring in an airport terminal. 153
Plaintiffs wishing to recover beyond the liability limitations of the
Warsaw Convention must show that an airline, in performing its secur-
ity-related duties, engaged in wilful misconduct. 154 The original text of
the Warsaw Convention provided little guidance to the appropriate defi-
nition of wilful misconduct. Subsequent protocols have failed to resolve
the controversy or achieve uniformity, especially since the United States
has not ratified any of the protocols.'55 United States courts appear to
have rejected an objective standard but, at the same time, have not em-
braced a subjective standard.' 56
United States courts should not broadly interpret the wilful miscon-
duct provision simply to bypass the Warsaw Convention liability limita-
tions which are generally not favored. 15 7 Congress should denounce the
Warsaw Convention and return to the negligence standard of potentially
unlimited airline liability applicable to domestic travel. In the meantime,
victims of terrorism might be better compensated through the use of
trust funds established either by the governments or by airlines. 58
Airline passengers require protection from terrorists. Courts can as-
sist passengers by not enforcing the Warsaw Convention's liability limita-
151 This would be similar to the Guatemala Protocol and the Montreal Protocol No. 3, supra note
11, both of which provide for "[r]ecognition of the right of each participating nation to establish a
supplemental compensation plan to operate within its territories." To this end, the Civil Aeronau-
tics Board in July 1977 approved a supplemental compensation plan that would provide an addi-
tional $200,000 for loss of life and unlimited medical coverage and assess a $2.00 per ticket surcharge
to provide for a compensation fund to pay supplemental recoveries. S. REP. No. 1, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 5 (1983).
152 See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
153 See supra notes 44-65 and accompanying text.
154 Warsaw Convention art. 25.
155 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
156 See supra notes 77-92, 100-02 and accompanying text.
157 See Berner, 219 F. Supp. at 322-23.
158 See supra notes 142-49 and accompanying text.
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tions, by using the less rigorous objective standard, or by adopting a
more liberal approach to the proximate cause issue. Nonetheless, such
interpretations of the Convention would conflict with the Convention's
aim of limiting airline liability. Until the Warsaw Convention is de-
nounced, the solution to the problems involved in increasing airline se-
curity measures lies with the government passing legislation and using
diplomacy to provide safer airports and with passengers using their
purchasing power to persade airlines to increase security measures.
Roberta L. Wilensky
